This paper considers deriving measures for assessing the benefits to firms as a result of granting executive stock option plans. The metrics developed relate to assessing the expected total earnings of the company attributed to executives due to executive stock option award. The paper derives metrics based on number of shares as well as on total value of assets. The values of these metrics can be used to compare and asses the benefits to the company in awarding stock option grants by comparing the metrics with actual realized changes in total earnings. The research work in the paper complements the empirical research of Murphy (1999) and others who found the pay-performance sensitivities due to executive stock option awards. Illustrations of the metrics are carried out to show their properties and in particular for the firm WAL-MART.
Introduction
Stock option grants have become the major component of the executive compensation as they reward the value creation better than other forms of compensation such as bonuses tied to earnings. Unlike traded stock options in the stock exchange where customers deal with already issued shares of the company, the executive stock option awards require the issue of new stocks by the company when they are exercised. Thus executive stock options (ESO) awards create a dilution of the company assets and earnings unless there is an improvement in them as a result of better executive management and performance. Issues related to executive stock options were not examined by regulatory authorities and the firms until recently when perceived wind falls of wealth to executives were publicized. Although such awards are justified on economic grounds, shareholders, financial analysts and politicians were critical of the absence of their disclosure to the public. As a result of criticisms, Financial Accounting Standard Board, FASB (FASB 123 (R)), now requires the ESO grants to be valued and included in the financial statement of the company. The issue of ESO is a risk to the firm and shareholders. A measure of such risk either on historical ground to a firm or across the firms is useful for executive compensation boards, shareholders and financial analysts. Using historical data, researchers have estimated the pay-performance sensitivities and elasticities of shareholder wealth due to executive compensation; for example in the papers by Hall and Liebman (1998) , Jensen and Murphy(1990b) , (Murphy (1999) . In this paper we establish formulae called metrics to estimates the expected total earnings attributed to executives due to the initiation of ESO awards. Formulae are based on earnings and the stock price process prior to ESO grant initiation. Thus subsequent to ESO award if the company earnings improves over and above that estimated by metrics derived, one could infer that the compensation provided has been beneficial to the firm.
Thus metrics derived are useful to shareholders, financial analysts and compensation boards. We illustrate the behavior of these metrics for several cases of selected parameter values and also use the data available in the public domain for the company WAL-MART and discuss the use of the metrics. under the award. We may replace the denominator of (1) by its expectation under risk neutral measure so that it reduces to
ESO Risk Metrics
where
and Q denotes the risk neutral measure.
Suppose that the company pays dividends at a compounding rate  per unit time.
The effect of the management of the company will be reflected in the total earnings.
We now calculate a risk metric by evaluating the proportion of the total earnings attributable to option awards after the end of exercising the series of ESOs. 
Using the appendix result and computing the expectation in (3), we have In this case we are attempting to evaluate components of the total earnings of the firm on dollar assets basis due to the ESO awards for a period commencing from the exercise of all stock options of the series of grants; the proportion used is evaluated based on the value of the company assets rather than per share as in case 1. Then the proportion of dollar assets at time t after the end of the exercise period attributable to executives due to stock options is given by
Again, for convenience we replace the denominator of (5) 
Now we derive the expected value of the expression for 2 W assuming risk neutral measure for X(t).
Now using Black-Scholes formula the expectation in the denominator of (6) is given by
The expectation in numerator component in (9) reduces to 
Hence the expression in (6) reduces to 
In the granting of ESO awards, the firm might place restrictions on exercising options based on firm's total earnings. This means that exercising of options is permitted provided that the total annual earnings or the share price exceed a pre-assigned value. Formulae for such cases can also be derived using similar computations as in deriving (4) and (10).
Numerical values for the Metrics (a)Illustrations with hypothetical parameter values
We examine the metrics given by relations (4) and (10) The following details from SEC 10K filings in January 2000 by the firm and those from its own web site are used for our illustrations. 
